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EXTRACTIVE RESOURCES, GLOBAL VOLATILITY




Africa is endowed with an incredible amount of natural resources of which
the extractive sector is a key component. Unfortunately, however, the continent
is characterized by a paradox of plenty or resource curse, depicting a situation
of abundant resources that have not translated into economic growth and
prosperity for the population. The potential role of the extractive sector is
further affected by global volatilities. This article reviews the importance of
the extractive sector to selected African countries. It identifies sources of
global volatility that affect the sector and further attempts to establish the
factors that drive the volatility-growth nexus. We use panel data covering 18
selected African countries from 1970-2013 to explain the gross domestic
product (GDP) growth. Volatility persistence estimates are also calculated.
The article further examines the policy space that African governments might
consider to make the extractive sector play a major role in the development
of the continent. We find that the extractive sector makes a huge contribution
to GDP of the selected countries. The empirical evidence also indicates that
12 out of 18 countries find it difficult to adjust their economies back to
equilibrium when hit with volatility shocks or changes in the volatility of
GDP growth.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Report2 defines extractive resources as a class of natural
resources. Specifically, they are “stocks of materials that exist in the
natural environment that are both scarce and economically useful in
production and consumption either in their raw state or after a minimal
amount of processing”. Extractive resources are exhaustible or non-
renewable, implying that only fixed quantities are available resulting
in increasing costs associated with depletion. They are also characterized
by about four things: uneven distribution across countries – resource
endowment varies considerably within countries and across countries;
externalities associated with their exploration; dominance in national
economies; and susceptibility to volatility. While some countries
(Congo, Angola, Algeria, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe, Tunisia,
Mali, Libya, Egypt, Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa, Mozambique, Sudan,
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Ghana) are blessed
abundantly with extractive resources such as gold, oil, copper, bauxite,
natural gas and other precious metals, other countries (Togo, Benin,
Morocco, Burkina Faso, Mali, among others) only have a little or
absolutely nothing to boast of. Exploration and extraction of such
resources often damage the environment, pollute the water bodies,
distort the natural habitats of bio-diversity and can ultimately result in
climate change. Also, due to the volatile nature of prices, their markets
are inherently unstable, which affects the growth in economies that
are dependent on these commodities.
Historically, commodity prices have been highly volatile and
unpredictable such that prices can increase by as much as from 40 to
80 percent.3 This has created enormous challenges for resource-rich
countries. Among these challenges are the highly volatile incomes4 for
the affected countries thereby distorting their fiscal balances.
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Furthermore, government expenditures in such countries are unstable
as they rise in times of commodity booms and fall with the commodity
prices fall, exacerbating economic volatility. These countries must
therefore deal with the long-run downward trend of the terms of trade
between commodities and manufactures5 and the inability of
commodity-exporting countries (CEC) to sustain growth trajectories
based on commodities. This is evident in the persistent fall in the
primary balance of 2015 for most resource exporting countries, which
saw about 5 percentage points fall in GDP on the average.6 African
countries such as Angola, Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Zambia, Gabon,
Cameroon and Botswana were unable to escape the deterioration in
the 2015 primary balance. Also, the recent experience with the world
price of oil exemplifies how volatile revenues from oil and gas can
become when prices fall tremendously.
There is a widespread perception that resource-rich countries have
an easy path to economic development. Reality is, however, different
as empirical evidence shows that countries with abundant resources
do not really depict high economic development. The phenomenon is
so common in these countries and is now known as the resource curse.7
The natural resource curse or the paradox of plenty is a phenomenon
that development practitioners have been dealing with over the past
three decades. The high volatility of extractive resource revenues and
other global volatility that most nations face in combination with other
institutional and structural shortcomings pose numerous challenges
in translating these resources to sustainable and inclusive growth. It is
important to note that resource revenues become highly volatile mainly
because developed nations drive the global demand for extractive
resources.8 It is now evident that CEC needs to design strategies that
allow them to manage their resources in a sustainable and transparent
manner to ensure that the growth prospects are improved.
5 UNCTAD: Excessive Commodity Price Volatility: Macroeconomic Effects on Growth
and Policy Options. Contribution from the UNCTAD Secretariat to the G20
Commodity Markets Working Group. United Nations publication, New York and
Geneva (2012).
6 IMF4 (n 4).
7 Ibid.
8 Bardouille, P., A. Hamblin & H. Pley. “Mining: Unearthing Africa’s Potential in
Africa’s Potential:” Mckinsey on Africa: A continent on the Move, McKinsey
Global Institute, New York (2010).
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No attempt is made in this article to do an extensive review of the
literature on this subject. However, it is important to observe that
numerous attempts have been made to gain an insight into how
volatility of natural resources revenues might affect growth.9 Cashin et
al (2002)10 show that real commodity prices affect real exchange
volatility. Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009)11 find evidence suggesting
that “the resource curse is foremost a problem of volatility”. Arezki
and Nabli (2012)12 also undertook a stock-taking exercise of economic
performance of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries over
forty years. The authors find that resource-rich countries in the region
experienced relatively low and non-inclusive economic growth and high
macroeconomic volatility.
This article aims to achieve two objectives. First, it reviews and
summarizes the importance of extractive resources to national
economies for a selected number of African countries. Second, it explores
the relationship that exists between volatility and economic growth.
With this in mind, section 2 examines the contribution of the extractive
sector to the national economies of selected African countries, using
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the metric. Section 3 reviews
the sources of global volatility drawing specific attention to how
volatility might hamper growth. The work in these two sections draws
on a survey of the literature and published data in the public domain.
In section 4, we provide evidence on the volatility-growth nexus by
estimating volatility persistence in the sample countries adapting a
panel data approach. The parameter aims to provide evidence on
whether the selected countries studied are able to adjust their
economies back to equilibrium when hit with volatility shocks. How
to make the best of the extractive sector is the subject section 5. The
section reviews, based on the literature, policy options that could
enhance the contribution of the sector to inclusive growth. We make
concluding remarks in the final section.
9 Aghion, Philip, Phillippe. Bacchetta, Romain Rancière and Kenneth. Rogoff.
2006. Exchange Rate Volatility and Productivity Growth: Throle of Financial
Development, Discussion Paper No. 5629, CEPR, London (2006).
10 Cashin, Paul, and C. John McDermott. “The Long-Run Behavior of Commodity
Prices: Small Trends and Big Variability. ”  IMF Staff Papers 49, No. 2 (2002),
175-199.
11 Van der Ploeg, Frederick, and Steven Poelhekke. “Volatility and the Natural
Resource Curse.” Oxford Economic Papers (2009), p. 027.
12 Arezki, Rabah, and Mustapha K. Nabli. “Natural Resources, Volatility, and
Inclusive Growth: Perspectives from the Middle East and North Africa” (2012).
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2.  EXTRACTIVE RESOURCES AND
AFRICAN ECONOMIES
This section provides evidence on the contribution of the extractive
sector to GDP in a select number of African countries. We also identify
channels through which the sector can expand domestic economic
opportunities besides its direct 20 contribution to GDP. The section
also includes a survey of the literature on why resource abundance has
not translated to growth prospects for some countries.
over the years, the extractive resources in Africa, including oil, gas,
mining and forestry, have contributed tremendously to output share
and played a major role in export earnings. Available evidence suggests
that 23 countries have about 10 per cent of annual output and 50 per
cent of their annual exports coming from extractive resources.13 For
sub-Saharan Africa, despite the high per capita real GDP since 2000,
the populations of these resource-rich countries are yet to experience
higher standards of living from the rent accumulation. While oil
exporters such as Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Angola, Congo, Gabon,
Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and Chad contribute more than half of
the total resource exports of Africa, other resource countries obtain at
least 20 per cent of their export earnings from mining.14 Sierra Leone,
Guinea, Namibia and the Democratic Republic of Congo obtain their
export earnings from a variety of extractive resources. Zambia and Niger,
however, are heavily dependent on Uranium and other base metals.
Table 1 shows the relative importance of the sector. The selected
countries presented in the table have total natural resource contribution
ranging from 3.8 per cent of GDP in Botswana to 73.4 per cent in the
Congo Republic. Further examination of the extractive sector (oil,
natural gas, and minerals) shows its contribution to GDP – for example,
Congo’s GDP draws mainly from oil (71 per cent). A number of
countries derive more than 40 per cent of their GDP from oil. These
include Equatorial Guinea (47.9 per cent), Gabon (42.8 per cent), and
Angola (42.6 per cent). The contribution to GDP from minerals is
comparatively much lower with the Democratic Republic of Congo (23.5
per cent) and Zambia (20.1 per cent) being the leaders. Comparing
13 Lundgren, Charlotte J., Mr Alun H. Thomas, and Mr Robert C. York. Boom,
Bust or Prosperity? Managing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Natural Resource Wealth.
International Monetary Fund, 2013.
14 Van der Ploeg & Poelhekke (n 12).
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sub-Saharan Africa as a whole to other regions in the world, it would
be seen that rents accruing from extractive resources in 2012 were
16.2 per cent and only slightly below the 20.9 per cent of the Middle
East and the North Africa region. This indicates that sub-Saharan Africa
in 2012 received resource rents greater than the 9.8 per cent average
of the world.15
A broader perspective indicates that besides its direct contribution
to GDP, the channels through which the extractive sector expands
domestic economic opportunities are well known. Wise & Shtylla
(2007)16 outline four of these. First, through the procurement of goods
and services, extractive industries, which are inherently capital
intensive, most often face pressure to turn to local suppliers to procure
goods and services. According to Wise & Shtylla,17 even though the
traditional extractive companies (mostly foreign) import machinery,
equipment and other inputs into the domestic countries, the vast
increase and changes in the contracts of these companies now oblige
them to in source these inputs. In doing so, economic opportunities
are expanded and resource-rich countries’ benefits will not only be
limited to revenues from extraction but also from new domestic
economic opportunities from the procurements of goods and services.
Second, extractive companies often use local distributors, suppliers
and retailers as intermediaries to meet their needs when procuring
goods and services. This is especially the case for downstream activities
in the oil, gas and minerals sectors. For instance, “Total, a leader in
downstream operations in Africa with a market share of 24.5 per cent,
operated seven refineries and 3,750 service stations as of 2005,
employing 8500 mostly national staff”.18 Many countries like Ghana
are designing policies that require companies in the extractive industry
to strengthen their local content in this regard.
Third, while the extractive sector is typically not known to be labour
intensive, employment opportunities are available during the
15 Lee, Munseob, and Cheikh Anta Gueye. “Do Resource Windfalls Improve the
Standard of Living in Sub-Saharan African Countries? Evidence from a Panel of
Countries” (2015).
16 Wyse, Holly, and Sokol Shtylla. “The Role of the Extractive Sector in Expanding
Economic Opportunity. ”  Harvard University: Economic Opportunity Series
(2007).
17 Wise & Shytylla (n 17).
18 Ibid.
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construction phases of the projects. In addition, these jobs quite often
pay higher salaries than the economy-wide averages. In scouting for
potential employees, companies directly invest in technical and tertiary
education targeting fields such as mining engineers, geologist,
petroleum engineering, among others. This decision provides human
capital development to the benefit of resource-rich countries.
Beneficiaries of this training will be able use these skills elsewhere
when and if these companies fold up their operations. These
employment opportunities therefore do lead to better economic welfare
of the people.
Table 1. Extractive Industries’ Contribution to GDP
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank 2015.







Algeria 28.2 21.6 6.1 0.1 0.3 
Angola 35.0 34.6   0.4 
Botswana 3.2   2.2 0.4 
Cameroon 9.1 5.5 0.2 0.2 3.2 
Chad 27.8 23.3   4.5 
Congo Republic 59.8 56.8   2.9 
Democratic Rep. of 
Congo 
40.0 2.5  18.6 19.0 
Côte d’Ivoire 8.4 3.6 0.8 1.4 2.5 
Egypt 10.9 7.0 3.0 0.3 0.5 
Equatorial Guinea 53.9 53.3   0.6 
Ethiopia 15.8   1.1 14.7 
Gabon 46.2 42.4 0.3 0.1 3.4 
Ghana 17.6 6.2  5.7 5.7 
Guinea 23.6   9.9 13.7 
Liberia 29.7   0.7 29.0 
Libya 47.0 44.2 2.7  0.2 
Mali 13.3   9.4 3.9 
Mozambique 15.7 0.1 4.1 0.1 8.3 
Nigeria 15.6 13.6 0.9  1.1 
Sierra Leone 7.9   0.3 7.6 
South Africa 9.2   3.7 0.6 
South Sudan 28.1 25.8   2.3 
Sudan 8.9 5.6  1.7 1.6 
Tanzania 7.9  0.3 3.6 4.0 
Tunisia 6.2 4.1 1.0 0.8 0.4 
Zambia 19.5   16.5 2.9 
Zimbabwe 11.7   5.4 4.2 
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19 Ibid.
20 Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Andrew M. Warner.  Natural Resource Abundance and
Economic Growth, No. w5398. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995.
21 Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Andrew M. Warner. “Sources of Slow Growth in African
economies.” Journal of African Economies, 6, No. 3 (1997): 335-376.
22 Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Andrew M. Warner. “The Curse of Natural Resources.”
European Economic Review, 45, Mo. 4 (2001): 827-838.
23 Mehlum, Halvor, Karl Moene and Ragnar Torvik. “Institutions and the Resource
Curse.” The Economic Journal, 116, No. 508 (2006): 1-20.
24 Arezki, Rabah, and Rick van der Ploeg. “Can the Natural Resource Curse Be
Turned into a Blessing? The Role of Trade Policies and Institutions” (2007).
Fourth, and in accordance to their codes of ethics, most companies
engage in corporate social responsibility. This investment in social and
community philanthropy provides links with other sectors of the
economy (agriculture, transport, telecommunications, finance, health,
education, environment and sports). These links can “create local
economic opportunity and generate medium-term benefit for extractive
companies”.19 Put together these social and community investments
tend to empower the poor when done conscientiously.
Following the statistics in Table 1, it would be expected that the
high revenue obtained from Africa’s extractive industries would translate
to growth and better living standards for its citizenry. Unfortunately,
this has not been the case for most countries on the continent. Most of
the resource-rich countries still face high levels of poverty, inequality,
poor sanitation, poor health system, illiteracy, and low human capital
formation. As a result, a lot of studies have focused on the resource
curse phenomenon. Most of such works were motivated by the works
of Sachs & Warner,20,21,22 who found that countries with natural resources
are more likely to have delayed growth compared to resource-scarce
countries.
Furthermore, other works have attributed several reasons for the
poor growth observed in Africa’s resource-rich countries. Mehlum et al
(2006)23 lame this on poor institutions due to deficient governance
practices while Arezki & van der Ploeg (2007)24 believe the exportation
of natural resources further worsens the quality of institutions, resulting
in the slow growth observed in resource-rich countries. Also, in
situations where well defined property rights are missing, the extractive
industries can attract the common pool problem which causes rent-
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Oxford (2001).
28 Isham, Jonathan, Michael Woolcock, Lant Pritchett and Gwen Busby. “The
Varieties of Rentier Experience: How Natural Resource Export Structures Affect
the Political Economy of Economic Growth” (2002)<www. middlebury. edu/
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Political Economy of Economic Growth. Middlebury College Economics Discussion
Paper No. 03-08 (2003).
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32 Mansoorian, Arman. “Resource Discoveries andExcessive External Borrowing.”
The Economic Journal, 101, No. 409 (1991): 1497-1509.
33 Mansoorian (n 33).
34 Van der Ploeg, Frederick. “Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?” Journal of
Economic Literature, 49, No. 2 (2011): 366-420.
seeking behaviour and corruption, leading to a deterioration in growth
levels of such countries.25,26,27,28,29,30,31
It has been argued that the tendency of resource-rich countries to
increase borrowings during boom periods (when commodity prices
are high) is more likely. This often results in such countries running
into crises when commodity prices fall, thereby affecting economic
growth.32Also in the quest to provide a better life for their citizens,
African countries engage in subsidies and welfare policies, which are
not sustainable when these r2esources diminish in quantity or
completely run out.33 Van der Ploeg’s (2011)34 review of extant literature
shows an inverse relationship between resource abundance and
economic growth.
Despite these unpleasant characteristics experienced in Africa’s
resource-rich SSA countries, there are few exceptions. Over the years,
Botswana, the world’s leading diamond producer, has defied the odds
of the resource curse and performed remarkably well in terms of
acceleration of economic growth. It is impressive to note that this
land-locked country which attained independence in the 1966 with
extreme low GDP per capita levels – poor road networks, inadequate
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35 Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson & James. A. Robinson. “An African Success
Story: Botswana”, in D. Rodrik (ed.), Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives
on Economic Growth, Princeton: Princeton University Press (2003).
36 African Development Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development and United Nations Development Programme, African Economic
Outlook, 2015.
37 International Monetary Fund Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks for Resource-
rich Developing Countries. Background Paper 1, Supplement 1 (2012).
38 ibid.
infrastructure, poor electricity, telephone, water, and sewage systems
with only 22 university graduates – could attain an upper-middle income
status after the discovery of diamonds.35 In 2013, Botswana’s diamonds
contributed about 80 per cent exports and one-fifth of output.36 Its
GDP per capita moved from US$3,500 in1980 to about US$12,500,
accounting for about 4.3 per cent annual growth rate.37 Table 2 presents
some of Botswana’s social and economic indicators.
Table 2. Selected Social and Economic indicators of Botswana for Five Decades
Sources: World Bank; World Development Indicators; and IMF staff estimates
(Adopted from IMF 2012).
Over the years, Botswana has been commended for its good
governance, transparent political process, sound fiscal system, quality
and acceptable regulation, low level of corruption and its ability to
manage the huge revenues obtained from its extractive industries.38





















In percent of 
GDP 
Total in years Per 1,00 
live 
births 
1960s 24 4.7 22.9 52 104 
1970s 757 10.9 33.9 57 76 
1980s 1,592 7.5 29.0 63 51 
1990s 2593 3.1 27.2 59 55 
2000s 3,778 2.5 24.7 51 49 
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39 Leith, James Clark. Why Botswana Prospered. McGill-Queen’s Press-MQUP,
2005.
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in Botswana. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World
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41 Dwyer, Alexandra, George Gardner and Thomas Williams. “Global Commodity
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57.
The country has been able to diversify its resource revenues
concentrating more on investment spending. Leith (2005)39 indicated
that Botswana invested over 25 per cent of its GDP and spent close to
40 per cent of its total revenues on human capital and infrastructure
over the past decades. The country also accumulates high foreign
exchange reserves from its resource rents which allow it to absorb the
shocks in the commodity markets when prices of natural resources
fall.40 These characteristics explain the sustainable and continuous
growth enjoyed by Botswana. It also emphasizes why Botswana is
seen as the best performer in sub-Saharan Africa.
3.  SOURCES OF GLOBAL VOLATILITY
Observable from the earlier sections, most African resource-rich
countries specialize in the exportation of primary commodities mainly
from their extractive industries. As a result, their budget requirements
depend heavily on the revenues from these commodities. They are,
therefore, at the mercy of commodity price volatility and
macroeconomic instability consequently dampening growth in such
countries. This has been the fundamental reason behind the resource
curse school of thought. Most studies on this phenomenon attribute
the poor economic growth to over-dependence or the sheer abundance
of extractive industries ignoring the effects of volatility sources or
channels. In this section, we explore these sources of global volatility
and examine how they could hamper economic growth.
The inelastic behaviour of commodity prices can be identified as a
major source of volatility.41 Compared to the prices of other goods and
services in the economy, commodity prices are more volatile because
global demand and supply of commodities in the short term are price
inelastic. For instance, it takes the extractive companies ample time to
increase production through the increase of mineral exploration,
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42 Caballero, Ricardo J., Emmanuel Farhi and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas. Financial
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of Economic Research, 2008.
43 Arezki, Rabah, Daniel Lederman and Hongyan Zhao. “The Relative Volatility of
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44 Deaton, Angus and Guy Laroque. “On the Behaviour of Commodity Prices.” The
Review of Economic Studies, 59, No. 1 (1992): 1-23.
45 Raddatz, C. 2011. Over The Hedge: Exchange Rate Volatility, Commodity Price
Correlations, and the Structure of Trade, Policy Research Working Paper
Series 5590, The World Bank.
discoveries of new technologies or the building of new mines. In the
same way it takes time for consumers to change their tastes and
preferences or habits (example: shifting from the use of gas to
electricity). This suggests that the response to demand and supply
shocks are more likely to result in movements of commodity prices in
order to attain equilibrium in the market.
Furthermore, Caballero et al (2008)42 argue that lack of a global
stable or safe asset could be the cause of commodity price volatility.
According to Arezki et al (2011)43 commodities “are goods that retain
their qualities over time, which allows economic agents to use them as
financial assets”. Gold, diamonds and other extractive resources are
ready examples in this regard. However, the act of storing or stockpiling
with the intention to be used in times of scarcity cause inelastic supply
and shortages which affect the stability of these commodities, resulting
in high price volatilities and affecting economic growth.44
International price fluctuations, which are driven by worldwide
demand and supply forces, also have significant effects on commodity
prices. These price fluctuations affect commodity-exporting countries
through fluctuations in their terms of trade, which also cause volatility
in real exchange rates. An increase in exchange rate volatility worsens
economic growth by negatively affecting investment and consumption
decisions of private agents. Hedging against exchange rate volatility
becomes costlier for private agents. Once firms are unable to hedge
against exchange rate volatility, export-oriented sectors are negatively
affected and growth in the economy dampens.45 An increase in exchange
rate volatility can create opportunities in the profit of firms only if they
can protect themselves from negative effects of hedging. In other words,
if firms or countries have the ability to adjust trade volumes to
movements in the exchange rate then they can protect themselves from
any negative effect. The trend actually worsens given that the export
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of commodities involve the exchange of currencies in the international
market, therefore, any persistent fluctuation in the exchange rate will
adversely affect commodity price, causing volatility in commodity prices
as well.
Hooper and Kohl Hagen (1978)46 and Cerbaf (1985)47 analysed
the theoretical relationship between exchange rate volatility and
international trade. Their argument is that the higher cost for risk-
averse traders is associated with higher exchange rate volatility which
leads to less foreign trade. They also pointed out that the exchange
rate is agreed upon at the time of trade contract, but payment is not
made until future delivery actually takes place. Therefore, if due to
rapid fluctuations, exchange rates become unpredictable, traders would
become uncertain about their profits, which would in effect reduce the
benefit of international trade.
Another medium through which exchange rate volatility caused by
fluctuations in the terms of trades can affect growth is investment.
Exchange rate affects investment through domestic and export sales.
With currency depreciation, goods domestically produced become less
expensive compared to foreign goods. This results in an increase in
demand for domestic goods. In the same way exports will increase
because they have become cheaper. For a given capital and labour,
marginal revenue products of capital and labour increase as a result of
convenient demand situations. The firm reacts by increasing its
investment in capital and, consequently, in labour.48 Also, exchange
rate affects investment through the price of imported inputs.
Depreciation raises total production costs and results in lower marginal
profitability of commodities. The effect of the exchange rate on the
marginal profitability is proportional to the share of imported inputs
into production.49
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The growth rate of per capita real GDP in the US also provides
signals for the global economic conditions. Putnam (2015)50 has
identified six potential sources of global volatility in this regard. They
are US rates, US treasury bond yields, US equities, crude oil, gold and
Euro. Decisions on the rise or fall of US rates depend mostly on good
timing, however, the information asymmetry existing (due to the
difficulty involved in obtaining data) in the markets has led to great
uncertainties. The potential result is that short-term real interest rates
in the US that reflect the cost of borrowing in the international market
may lead to price movements about a trend.
One of the most important drivers of global economy is crude oil.
Any changes to the price of oil affect welfare and growth globally.
Exogenous effects, such as conflicts, political instability, natural disasters
and so on can disrupt supply and affect the global oil price. The persistent
conflicts and instability in the exporting countries, for instance, Congo
and the difficulty and time it takes to discover new reserves cause
fluctuations in oil prices. Since oil is a major source of energy in most
countries, fluctuations in its prices does not only cause fluctuations in
the revenues of these exporting countries but also leads to a decrease
in the welfare of consumers and in totality affects economic growth.
Finally, stock market returns, which reflect global financial
conditions, can be a source of the volatility of commodity prices. Many
authors51,52,53 have shown the causal connection between the growth
trend of output and the volatility of output around that trend. The
overwhelming conclusion is that macroeconomic volatility has negative
(adverse) consequences on economic growth although other studies
argue otherwise. There are a number of channels through which
volatility affects (mostly negatively) growth. Fluctuating commodity
prices increases uncertainty and risk and, therefore, discourages
investment, which could have direct negative consequences on
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economic growth. Similarly, when these fluctuations lead to a decline
in the terms of trade, this could translate into a decline in fiscal revenues
for the state with direct effect on economic growth.
Another channel, as shown by Arezki & Nabli,54 is related to the
implications on saving/investment decisions by state and non-state
actors that could affect economic performance. Significant and relevant
here is how these revenues that pass through governments’ coffers
may be prone to rent-seeking by the state and other key actors.
UNCTAD55 provides an extensive discussion of the impact of commodity
price volatility on economic growth.
4.  THE VOLATILITY-GROWTH NEXUS
Volatility measures the variation (persistence rise or fall) of a parameter,
which could be price or growth rate over time. It is not a directional
measure but that of dispersion. It involves evaluating the deviation
between the values of a parameter and its equilibrium value; hence
the distribution of the variable around its mean or trend. The measure
is very important in risk management. Volatility-growth nexus can
simply be defined as the relationship that exists between volatility
and growth. This section provides evidence on the volatility-growth
nexus by estimating volatility persistence for a select number of African
countries.
Most developing countries are known to be among the world’s
most volatile countries, including small countries like Togo and
Dominican Republic as well as large countries like Argentina and China.
Among these volatile countries are a number of resource-rich or
commodity-dependent countries like Nigeria. The list also includes
growing industrialized countries.
Given our discussions in the above sections, there is enough reason
to believe that volatility and growth are related. But no consensus has
been reached in the literature on whether volatility affects growth
negatively or positively. While cross-country correlations show a negative
relationship between volatility and growth, the disaggregation of these
countries into poor countries middle-income countries and developed
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Econometrics and Quantitative Studies, 6, No. 2 (2009): 83-116.
countries shows totally different results.56 The relationship between
volatility and growth for developed countries is positive, negative for
less developed countries and almost zero for middle income countries.
Furthermore, limiting the scope to African countries, we realize that
the few studies conducted on the subject are limited to volatility and
other macroeconomic variables such as investment, trade, exports and
not necessarily growth. For instance, Kyereboah-Coleman and Agyire-
Tettey57 and Osinubi and Amaghionyeodiwe58 investigated the effect of
volatility on foreign direct investment in sub-Saharan Africa and Nigeria,
respectively. The studies concluded that volatility and foreign direct
investment were negatively related. It is against this background that
we empirically explore volatility-growth-nexus in this section focusing
on 18 commodity exporting countries (Congo, Angola, Algeria, Gabon,
Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe, Tunisia, Mali, Libya, Egypt, Cote d’Ivoire,
South Africa, Mozambique, Sudan, Congo D.R. and Ghana).
We start by looking at the volatility trends in growth and commodity
prices mainly of gold and crude oil in these countries using the World
Development Indicators (2014) dataset from 1982 to 2013. Figure1
shows how volatile commodity prices are compared to their
corresponding growth values. The figure shows a steady decrease in
the prices of gold during the 1980s rising through the 2000s until they
reached a peak in 2011, after which it began a sharp decline. The price
of crude oil on the other hand saw a slow decline for a decade (1986-
1996) after which it increased but was unable to sustain this increase
due to the 2008 global financial crisis. Although it picked up again in
2010, it again faced a massive fall in prices in 2015.
The fluctuations in commodity prices are seen to affect the stability
of growth, resulting in the volatility in growth too as depicted in
Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Commodity Prices and Volatility
A scatter plot of average growth for the entire period against the
volatility of growth measured through its standard deviation in Figure
2 clearly shows a high concentration of countries with low growth
rates and low volatility. The majority of these countries experienced
average growth rates around5 per cent and their estimated volatilities
did not exceed 10 per cent (using the standard deviation of growth
rate). Two countries, namely, Equatorial Guinea and Libya, are
exceptions. Libya has high growth rate volatility (about 34 per cent)
and an average growth rate around 5 per cent.
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Equatorial Guinea experienced both high growth volatility and high
average growth rate during the same period. In the case of countries
with high volatility, a suitable possible prescription is for higher
precautionary saving rates. That is, such countries could operate a
sinking fund where some percentage of their revenues obtained from
commodities exports is stored and used when revenues are unable to
support national budgets due to various volatility sources.
The panels in Appendix 1 depict the visual relation between GDP
and prices of crude oil (Angola, Algeria, Nigeria, Libya, and Egypt) and
gold (Ghana, Mali, South and Guinea). It is evident that the growth
rates in the respective countries do not necessarily follow the observed
increases in the prices of the commodities. It can be argued that, in the
absence of statistical estimation, the revenues do not translate to
growth in the economies.
We undertook a regression analysis aimed at explaining GDP growth
in a total of 18 selected countries in Africa (see Table 1 for the countries
involved). Data covering 1970 to 2013 was obtained from the World
Development Indicators (2013). We used panel estimation technique
involving 817 observations. The variables used for the estimation were
GDP per capita, volatility of GDP growth, oil rents (percentage of GDP),
terms of trade adjustment (constant LCU) and natural gas rents
(percentage of GDP).
Three major approaches can be used in measuring volatility. First,
it can be calculated as the standard deviation of the growth of a variable.
Second, it can be estimated as the standard deviation of the residual
of an econometric regression of the Generalized Auto Regressive
Conditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH) and Exponential Generalized
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (EGARCH) types. Third,
it can be represented by the standard deviation of the cycle isolated by
statistical filter. Cariolle59 provides a detailed coverage of the measuring
of macroeconomic volatility. For the purposes of this work, the GARCH
is employed. Table 3 captures the summary statistics of data used.
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Table 3: Summary statistics
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 4 for
both the Difference and System Generalized Methods of Moments
(GMM) estimations. The results are consistent with our expectations
of a negative relationship between volatility and GDP growth. In both
models, the parameters are significant at a 0.01 per cent level. We also
observe that all variables in the System equation including the lagged
values of growth (LYL1) are significant in explaining GDP growth. In
the Differenced equation the oil rent variable is not significant. While
the terms-of-trade variable is significant in both equations, its effect in
explaining GDP is consistently small in both equations.
Table 4. Difference and System Estimation of Economic Growth
Notes: ** p< 0.05; *** P <0.01[t-values are in parenthesis]
Observations 745
AR-Test (order 1) t = -7.938 P-value =0.000 –
AR-Test (order 2) t = -0.049 P-value=0.6200 –
Sargan Test Prob > chi2 =0.058    Prob >chi2=0.000
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
GDP per capita 20.56 1.12 4.72 9.52 
Volatility 0.43 0.84 -0.99 11.21 
Oil Rent 10.44 16.66 0 79.27 
Terms of Trade 20.11 4.76 10.81 27.74 
Natural Gas Rent 0.89 2.48 0 21.25 
 
Variables Difference (GMM) System (GMM) 
LYL1 0.82 
    (25.78) *** 
0.91 
     (28.62) *** 
Volatility -0.17 
    (-16.72) *** 
-0.14 
    (-14.76) *** 
Oil Rent 0.00 
(0.88) 
0.00 
     (7.41)*** 
Terms of Trade 1.17e-15 
      (2.22)** 
1.01e-14 
   (2.43)** 
Natural Gas Rents 0.00 
      (6.60)*** 
0.00 
    (3.21)*** 
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Furthermore, the sum of the coefficient of the ARCH and GARCH
terms in the estimation of volatility (see Appendix 2) enables us to
measure the persistence in volatility shocks.60,61 When the sum of these
two terms equals to one for any particular country, it means that the
country’s response to volatility shocks is at a slow pace. On the other
hand, when the sum of the terms is lower than one it means countries
easily adjust to volatility shocks. The benchmark takes the value of
one, the closer the summed value is to one the slower the adjustment
rate.
Volatility persistence in GDP growth for the resource-rich economies
is captured in Table 5. For 12 out of the18 selected countries, persistence
measures were at least close to unity, indicating that most resource-
rich countries in Africa find it difficult to adjust their economies back
to equilibrium when hit with volatility shocks or changes in the volatility
of GDP growth. While volatility persistence is highest in Congo, Angola,
Algeria, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe, Tunisia, Mali, Libya Egypt
and Cote D’Ivoire, the level of GDP growth volatility is much lower in
South Africa, Mozambique, Sudan, DRC and Ghana. Notably, the overall
results on the panel indicate that most Africans that are blessed with
extractive commodities are unable respond at a faster rate when they
face volatility shocks. This may be due to their total dependence on
resource rents and their inability to invest their export revenues.
The empirical results attest to the presence of volatility in African
economies. This has negative effects on economic growth in resource-
rich African countries. Other determinants of growth, such as oil and
gas rent and terms of trade, are also identified. Unfortunately, for such
countries, it takes longer periods to adjust their economies when faced
with volatility. The next section explores some policy options in this
regard.
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Table 5. Volatility Persistence in GDP Growth
Source: Authors’ calculation.
5.  MAKING THE BEST OF THE EXTRACTIVE SECTOR
In this section, we briefly examine what needs to be done for the
extractive sector to play a transformational role in African economies,
specifically in enhancing inclusive growth. The following discussion
draws from documented experience worldwide.
First, there is an emerging trend in the continent to create revenue
stabilization funds. These funds ensure macroeconomic stability and
minimize real exchange rate fluctuations. Some countries have used
these funds to boost savings by creating sovereign wealth funds (SWF).
SWFs are growing very fast in Africa although they account for about
Countries Volatility Persistence  
)( 11 βατ +=  
Angola 0.7224 
Algeria 0.9754 












South Africa 0.1244 
Democratic Republic of Congo 0.4440 
Zimbabwe 0.8594 
Tunisia 0.9879 
Cote D’Ivoire 0.6596 
Panel 0.9781 
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0.3 per cent of global SWF.62 SWF can promote domestic growth, help
boost credit rating (as in the case of Angola), and lower borrowing
cost on international markets. Leading SWFs in Africa are in Botswana
(US$6.9 billion), Angola (US$5 billion) and Nigeria (US$1 billion).63
The key element in SWF is to enhance savings, which can eventually
be used for infrastructural development, human capacity building and
sustainable economic development.64 Saving of resource income has
been shown to be effective in helping resource-rich countries to escape
the resource curse. Torvik65 found that of 11 countries, which claimed
to have escaped the resource curse, only one had negative saving rates.
The same study shows that seven out of nine countries with negative
saving rates had not escaped the resource curse.
Second, smoothing price fluctuations can ensure that price volatility
is reduced. Policies that reduce high variability of prices would have
direct effects on fiscal revenues. Lower volatility in resource revenues
ensures stability in the available funds for economic development.
Third, a deliberate effort to promote inclusive growth can provide
opportunities for the extractive sector. Equitable sharing of revenues
and attacking inequalities in income are channels through which
inclusive growth can be promoted. Using the SWF to support social
protection programmes could be an effective mechanism to achieve
inclusive growth.
Fourth, improving transparency and accountability is another key
element. The lack of transparency and accountability leads to the
presence of rent seekers and the increase in corruption. For the extractive
sector to play an important role in economic growth, there should be
increased transparency and accountability for all the state and non-
state actors. Improved transparency and accountability will also play
an important role in reducing conflicts that many resource-rich countries
experience. Along with improving transparency and accountability is
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the need to improve the local participation in mineral resource
development (Ibid. 55). Associated with this is the need for prudent
financial management and fiscal discipline. Many a time countries
initiate new projects simply because they discovered new extractive
resources. It is important to manage the expectations of the population
so as not to fall into the trap of over-commitment of expected resources.
Finally, resource-rich countries need to diversify their economies.
A key strategy is to promote linkages with other sectors of the economy
and to stimulate value addition66 in the sector. SWF could catalyse
economic diversification and ensure that growth prospects remain stable
in the face of high volatility of resource rents. A policy option that
aims to enhance economic diversification can, therefore, be seen to
improve the growth trajectory of resource-rich countries.
6.  CONCLUSION
Owing to the volatility of commodity prices, extractive resources
revenues are highly volatile. Broadly speaking, international price
fluctuations driven by worldwide demand and supply forces, growth
rate of per capita real GDP in the US, short-term interest rates in the
US (reflecting the cost of borrowing on the international market) and
stock market returns (reflecting global financial conditions) are the
other major sources of global volatility. Put together, these volatilities
affect economic growth through a number of channels, including terms
of trade, saving/investment and income distribution, inflation and
exchange rates.
The extractive sector is making a very huge direct contribution to
GDP in resource-rich countries in Africa. The sector also provides
numerous domestic economic opportunities. The ability of the extractive
resources to play a critical role on Africa’s growth prospects hinges on
efficient macroeconomic management. This can provide opportunities
for countries to manage price fluctuations so as to achieve structural
transformation and capital formation. Translating extractive resources
extraction to economic growth and transformation requires coherent
policies, fiscal discipline and strong institutional frameworks.
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The evidence provided in this chapter suggests that volatility
persistence in GDP growth for 12 out of the 18 selected countries were
at least close to unity. This indicates that these resource-rich countries
find it difficult to adjust their economies back to equilibrium when hit
with volatility shocks or changes in the volatility of GDP growth.
The discourse on the contribution of the extractive sector to growth
needs to be cast in a broader context. Given the available knowledge,
we propose a sustainable development framework buttressed by a
paradigm centred on what we call the Six I’s (ideas, incentives,
innovations, institutions, infrastructure and implementation). The
extractive sector will be poised to make unprecedented contribution
to growth in Africa if each of the parameters of the framework is given
careful attention. There will be need to develop new ideas on how to
transfer wealth from mining companies to governments, for instance.
The appropriate incentives that would enhance public private
partnership in the sector are necessary. How these incentives lead to
innovations in the management of the extractive sector is clearly
important. The development of the institutional framework and required
infrastructure are critical elements that can enhance productivity in
the extractive sector. Finally, coherent strategies and mining visions
exist but have not been adequately implemented. Implementation of
strategies, visions and policies will go a long way to enable the
extractive sector become a key player for sustained and inclusive
growth.
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Appendix I. Real Commodity Prices vis á visGrowth Rates, 1982 to
2013
Angola (Crude Oil)                                       Algeria (Crude Oil)
Nigeria (Crude oil)                                          Libya (Crude oil)
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Egypt (Crude oil)
Ghana (Gold)                                                       Mali (Gold)
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South Africa (Gold)                                             Guinea (gold)
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Appendix 2. Volatility Estimations
 Dependent Variable: GDP_PER_CAPITA  
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Sample: 1 836    
Included observations: 836   
 
GARCH = C(2) + C(3)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(4)*GARCH(-1) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C 449.4067 2.688777 167.1417 0.0000 
 Variance Equation   
C 25544.10 2491.211 10.25369 0.0000 
RESID(-1)^2 1.465732 0.028651 51.15848 0.0000 
GARCH(-1) -0.000765 0.005960 -0.128417 0.8978 
R-squared -0.277753     Mean dependent var 1670.540 
Adjusted R-squared -0.277753     S.D. dependent var 2318.427 
S.E. of regression 2620.697     Akaike info criterion 15.88115 
Sum squared resid 5.73E+09     Schwarz criterion 15.90378 
Log likelihood -6634.322     Hannan-Quinn criter. 15.88983 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.074475    
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Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH   
F-statistic 0.000531     Prob. F(1,833) 0.9816 
Obs*R-squared 0.000532     Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.9816 
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: WGT_RESID^2  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/11/15   Time: 19:16   
Sample (adjusted): 2 836   
Included observations: 835 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.868070 0.200257 4.334769 0.0000 
WGT_RESID^2(-1) 0.000799 0.034648 0.023047 0.9816 
R-squared 0.000001     Mean dependent var 0.868763 
Adjusted R-squared -0.001200     S.D. dependent var 5.717571 
S.E. of regression 5.721000     Akaike info criterion 6.328557 
Sum squared resid 27263.96     Schwarz criterion 6.339880 
Log likelihood -2640.172     Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.332898 
F-statistic 0.000531     Durbin-Watson stat 2.000002 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.981618    
 
